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THE LIABILITY OF PROVIDERS OF MENTAL HEALTH 
SERVICES IN NEGLIGENCE 
ANTHONY GRAY* 
Recently the High Court considered the question of the liability of a 
mental health provider for the actions of someone whom they had 
briefly treated. 1   After a short period during which the service 
involuntarily detained the individual under relevant legislation, the 
service released the individual into the care of a friend.  Later on that 
day, the person released killed his friend.  The High Court allowed an 
appeal against a finding of the New South Wales Court of Appeal that 
the mental health service provider had owed, and had breached, legal 
obligations to the family of the person killed, denying compensation to 
the family on the basis the service provider did not owe a duty of care 
to the family.  It will be argued the High Court was wrong to deny 
that a mental health service provider could owe, or did owe, a duty of 
care to victims of those to whom the service provider provided services. 
INTRODUCTION 
The common law has long struggled to provide a rational basis to explain the 
circumstances in which the actions or omissions of one person leading to injury 
or death to another are actionable.  For a time the law was content to accept 
that certain categories of relationship gave rise to civil obligations recognised by 
the law,2 apply strict rules forbidding recovery in other categories of case,3 but 
deny a generalised duty of care.  This changed in 1932 with acceptance of a 
generalised duty of care principle based on the concept of reasonable 
 
* Professor, USQ School of Law and Justice 
1 Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna; Hunter and New England Local 
Health District v Simon [2014] HCA 44 (Hunter). 
2 Heaven v Pender (1883) 11 QBD 503 (CA). 
3 For example, the doctrine of common employment making it more difficult for employees to 
successfully sue their employers, and the defence of contributory negligence applied as a 
complete defence: Butterfield v Forrester (1809) 11 East 60; 103 ER 926; Priestley v Fowler (1837) 
3 Mees and Wels 1; 150 ER 1030, non-liability of highway authorities with respect to non-
feasance: Parsons v St Mathew, Bethnal Green (1867) LR 3 CP 56, 60 (Willes J), Buckle v 
Bayswater Road Board (1936) 57 CLR 259; denial that a property owner owes a duty of care to 
users of a nearby road, with respect to straying animals not known to be dangerous: Searle v 
Wallbank [1947] AC 341; SGIC v Trigwell (1979) 142 CLR 617, denial of a claim by one person 
based on the death of another: Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, 170 ER 1033; Woolworths Ltd 
v Crotty (1942) 66 CLR 603. 
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foreseeability and ‘neighbours’,4 together with statutory reform.5  The difficulty 
has been that at least in some circumstances, the Donoghue principle is seen to 
provide, or at least to raise fears of, ‘too much’ liability, or open-ended liability 
which might have undesirable social consequences. 6   This objection has 
sometimes generally,7 and sometimes in relation to particular categories of case, 
led to the development of  principles that make it harder in particular cases to 
successfully bring an action.  Examples of the latter have involved claims of 
what lawyers call ‘nervous shock’,8 claims for purely financial loss,9 and claims 
against public authorities.10  The recent High Court decision involved both the 
first and third type of these ‘difficult’ cases.  The Court has also noted that it is 
‘exceptional’ to find one person liable for the actions or omissions of another.11  
That is also a feature of the current context.  I turn now to explain the case and 
the decisions made with respect to it (Part A), before placing the decision in the 
broader context of precedent and principle (Part B).  In Part C, I explain why I 
respectfully believe the High Court decision was incorrect. 
 
4 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562. 
5 For example, legislation known colloquially as ‘Lord Campbell’s Act’ to overcome most of the 
impact of the decision in Baker v Bolton (1808) 1 Camp 493, 170 ER 1033; see generally Peter 
Handford ‘Lord Campbell and the Fatal Accidents Act’ (2013) 129 Law Quarterly Review 420; 
s24A Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic)(abolition of doctrine of common employment); and the 
introduction of civil liability legislation in some jurisdictions following the insurance ‘crisis’ of 
the early 21st century: eg Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 
6 In other words, ‘liability in an indeterminate amount, for an indeterminate time to an 
indeterminate class’: Ultramares Corp v Touche 174 NE 441, 444 (N.Y Court of Appeals 
1932)(Cardozo J). 
7 For example, the use of the notion of ‘proximity’ as a control mechanism (Gala v Preston 
(1991) 172 CLR 243, or the explicit consideration of policy reasons (if any) for the denial of a 
duty of care: Anns v Merton LBC [1978] AC 728; Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 
605; subsequently proximity was rejected: Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159; more recently the 
use of concepts such as ‘control’ and ‘vulnerability’ have been adopted: Perre v Apand Pty Ltd 
(1999) 198 CLR 180. 
8 Examples of ‘control mechanisms’ used here have included the concept of a person with 
normal fortitude, the concept of a ‘sudden shock’ and concepts of direct perception and 
immediate aftermath: Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; 
subsequently these fell out of favour in the common law: Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 
CLR 317. 
9 For instance, a requirement of an assumption of responsibility and (reasonable) reliance: 
Hedley Byrne v Heller and Partners [1964] AC 465. 
10 For example, past distinctions between policy and operational decisions, use of so-called 
Wednesbury unreasonableness to determine the liability of a public authority: Sutherland Shire 
Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; Shovin v Wise [1996] AC 923; the fact that non-feasance 
was not actionable (overturned in Australia in Brodie v Singleton (2001) 206 CLR 512; legislation 
abolishing past Crown immunity from suit includes the Petition of Rights Act 1860 (UK) and 
Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK), Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth)(s64), and Australian state legislation. 
11 Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256, 262-262 (Dixon J)(excepting vicarious liability); see also 
Michael v Chief Constable South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [97](Lord Toulson, with whom 
Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agreed). 
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I SIGNIFICANT FACTS, DECISION OF COURT OF APPEAL AND HIGH 
COURT 
The facts were tragic.  Mr Pettigrove (P) had suffered mental illness for at least 
20 years.  He suffered from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and was being 
treated for this condition in regional Victoria.  While in New South Wales with 
a friend Rose (R), he was taken by ambulance to the hospital, primarily because 
he was experiencing ‘physical jerks’.  Upon arrival at 4.30am, a doctor 
contacted Dr Coombes who advised the doctor to complete the documentation 
to allow P to be involuntarily detained in the hospital under that state’s mental 
health legislation, and to give P an injection of an anti-psychotic drug and a 
sedative.  In order that P be so detained, it was necessary to obtain appropriate 
authorisations.  Dr Coombes, who observed P at the hospital signed to the 
effect that P was mentally ill within the meaning of the Act, as did the 
superintendent of the hospital at the time.  The form was completed by a duty 
doctor Dr Saw, who noted that P was suffering suicidal ideation, and psychotic 
depression (with a question mark).  His notes included a statement of ‘concern 
harm to self/others’.  Dr Saw indicated on the forms that the patient’s detention 
was necessary for his own protection and that of others.  A form that Dr 
Coombes signed confirmed that P had presented with ‘depression (and was) 
psychotic’, and that the principal diagnosis was ‘exacerbation of chronic 
paranoid schizophrenia’. 
Later that morning, an Assessment of Current Presentation form was 
completed by a clinical nurse.  The assessment reiterated the ‘physical jerks’ 
symptoms and explained them as psychotic phenomena.  It records the patient 
reporting hearing voices that bothered him, that he had a history of not taking 
his medication.  Another form, apparently completed by an unidentified nurse, 
rated P 2 out of 7 on a ‘overactive, aggressive, disruptive or agitated’ scale and 3 
out of 7 on a ‘problems with hallucinations and delusions’ scale.  A similar form 
completed by another nurse the following day scored P 0 and 1 respectively on 
these criteria. 
The legislation at the time required that any person involuntarily detained 
under mental health legislation had to be examined within 12 hours of 
admission by the medical superintendent at the hospital.  The person could 
only be kept in detention if the superintendent certified that the person was 
mentally ill or mentally disordered.  The superintendent, Dr Wu, stated that P 
was mentally ill, noting that she had observed ‘bizarre behaviour, inappropriate 
eye movement plus verbal activity, suicidal ideation, unresponsive at times, and 
concern harm to self/others’, with a conclusion of ‘schizophrenia’.  The Act 
required a further review to be conducted by a psychiatrist.  Dr Coombes did 
this review, and he also concluded P was mentally ill.  His notes recorded his 
awareness of P’s long history of paranoid schizophrenia, having sighted P’s 
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medical history from Victoria.  (This medical history was extensive, including a 
history of non-compliance with medication, jumping in front of trucks, lying 
face down on roadways, talking to himself, likely auditory hallucinations).  He 
noted the patient looked perplexed and bewildered.  He noted the patient had 
not taken medication for at least 7 months.  His notes concluded that the 
patient should be detained overnight, and then transferred to his mother’s 
home in rural Victoria in the company of his friend Rose.  Dr Coombes then 
arranged for P to be taken from the assessment area to the secured mental 
health unit; he arranged two ‘solid males from emergency’ to make this transfer. 
On the day that P was involuntarily detained, Dr Coombes spoke with P, 
P’s mother, and R.  Dr Coombes apparently discussed various treatment 
options with P’s mother and R.  Dr Coombes noted that P’s mother wanted him 
home in Victoria, and Rose was happy to drive him home.  It was agreed that P 
would be detained in the New South Wales hospital overnight, and that R 
would then drive with P to his mother’s home in regional Victoria, near where 
he had been receiving medical treatment to date.  This would involve a car trip 
of approximately 1000 kilometres.  Dr Coombes noted that his strong 
preference was for the pair to travel a route with a number of psychiatric 
services along it, so they could provide assistance along the way if needed. 
Following that meeting, Dr Coombes completed another form.  He ticked 
boxes indicating that there was no foreseeable risk of P inflicting harm on 
himself or others.  On this form, he again referred to the patient’s long-term 
schizophrenia condition, noting the patient was ‘not obviously hallucinating’.  
He indicated there was no apparent risk to himself or to others, and that P was 
to be given no medication upon discharge.  This was apparently because the 
two would be sharing the driving, and Dr Coombes did not want to make P 
drowsy.  In the event, he was given one night’s supply of medication.  The 
evidence was that if P had been given a depo injection prior to commencement 
of the journey, it would have reduced the risk of ‘something untoward’ 
happening on the journey. 
During the night in which P was detained in the New South Wales facility, 
he was observed by nursing staff.  They noted that he remained awake at all 
times during that evening, and appeared to be speaking to himself loudly.  
When nursing staff approached the door to his room, he would become quiet. 
On the next day, P was discharged into the care of his friend R.  R arrived 
at the hospital a few hours later than what had been agreed on the previous day.  
This was relevant in terms of the journey from regional New South Wales to 
regional Victoria.  As indicated, it was a journey of approximately 1200 
kilometres.  The fact that the two set off later than originally anticipated 
increased the risk of something going wrong during the journey.  There was 
medical evidence to suggest that the risk of someone with paranoid 
schizophrenia suffering an ‘attack’ was higher at night than during the day.  
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During this journey, P said he started to believe that R had killed him in a 
previous life.  He strangled and killed R in the vehicle.  Subsequently P 
committed suicide.  The legal claim was brought by members of R’s family.  His 
mother and sisters claimed they developed a psychiatric condition as a result of 
what happened to R, and they claimed the medical authority was liable to them 
in negligence.  The trial judge found that the medical authority had not 
breached its duty of care to the family; the Court of Appeal found by majority 
(Macfarlan JA and Beazley P, Garling J dissenting) that the medical authority 
breached the duty of care it owed to the family; the High Court found the 
medical authority did not owe a duty of care to the family, dismissing their 
claim. 
The medical evidence considered in the case was considerable, and in some 
ways conflicting.  To summarise: 
• Dr G concluded Dr Coombes had made a ‘fundamental error of 
judgment’ in deciding to release P one day after he had been 
involuntarily detained.  Dr G stated it was most unwise to place P in 
the care of a friend when P’s behaviour (including being awake all 
night, talking loudly to himself) suggested strongly he was 
experiencing auditory hallucinations.  This made him a significant 
risk to himself and others.  Dr G said this error was compounded by 
the failure to give P an injection prior to his release; it was not enough 
to provide him with medication for one night; his history suggested 
he would not take it.   A longer time period was needed to properly 
assess P given that some psychosis suffers could have brief periods of 
lucidity.  There was little prospect of ongoing treatment if and when 
he got back to Victoria. 
• Dr K essentially agreed with Dr G, emphasising P’s record of failing to 
take medication, and past reckless and dangerous behaviour.  Dr K 
found it was likely that on the day of admission to hospital P was 
likely ‘acutely psychotic’, such that a conclusion by Dr Coombes on 
the following day that P was ‘no(t) an apparent risk to safety of self or 
others’ was not a conclusion reasonably available on the evidence, and 
contradicted information on other forms completed regarding P’s 
admission.  Dr K noted that the time P had been involuntarily 
detained, it was noted that P was at risk of harm to self and/or others.  
Nothing occurred in the following 24 hours to change this assessment. 
• Dr P noted the observations of the nurses on the night P spent in the 
hospital were critical.  They suggested that P was psychotic.  Even if it 
was appropriate to decide on the previous day to release him on the 
next day, the nurse’s observations rendered it inappropriate.  Dr P 
noted paranoid schizophrenia was associated with unpredictable 
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behaviour.  It was not clear that Dr Coombes had sought or obtained 
the records of the nurses’ observations of P overnight, prior to P’s 
release the following morning. 
• Dr C concluded Dr Coombes had made reasonable decisions.  Dr C 
said that a diagnosis of psychosis was not a reason in itself to keep 
someone in hospital.  The risk of someone with psychosis committing 
homicide was ‘not much greater than for the so-called normal 
population’.  P had no prior history of violence or harm to others.  His 
scores of 0 and 1 on the test administered by the nurse on the second 
day were relevant.  It might have prudent to delay discharge until the 
patient had settled for some days, but this was due to the risk P might 
harm himself, not that he would harm others, which Dr C found to be 
virtually impossible to predict. 
• Dr T essentially agreed with Dr C.  Dr T understood and supported 
the decision to lightly medicate P prior to the journey.  Dr T said the 
risk of an assault on others was not reasonably foreseeable. 
• Dr P also essentially agreed with Dr C, concluding Dr Coombes’ 
decisions were not inappropriate.  P had no prior violent history to 
others.  Attempts to transfer him to Victoria were understandable 
given his family network was there.  Long-term sufferers of paranoid 
schizophrenia typically became less dangerous over time.  Dr P also 
noted statistics stating that about 52% of those with paranoid 
schizophrenia involuntarily detained under mental health legislation 
were discharged the following day.   
All doctors agreed P was not fit to fly, even with an escort. 
A Court of Appeal 
By a majority of 2-1, the Court, in a very thorough judgment of 65 pages, found 
that the mother and sisters of Mr Rose were entitled to compensation based on 
a breach of the (common law) duty of care owed by the medical authority to 
them.12  Macfarlan JA expressed the majority view, in terms with which Beazley 
P expressed agreement. 
Macfarlan JA considered the elements of a negligence action.  It is 
noteworthy that he did so in the context of whether the medical authority owed 
a duty of care to Rose, rather than whether they owed one to members of Rose’s 
family.  The assumption appears to have been made that if the hospital owed a 
duty of care to Rose, it would owe one to his family.13   
 
12 This was not a claim for breach of statutory duty. 
13 [85]; Macfarlan JA said it was sufficient to consider whether the hospital owed a duty of care 
to Rose, since the hospital did not argue that the question of whether a duty of care was owed to 
(a) Rose and (b) his family might have different answers.   The High Court cast doubt on the 
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Macfarlan JA was satisfied that such a duty of care existed, and noted that 
the trial judge had assumed that a relevant duty of care arose.  The duty of care 
he accepted was a duty owed by the hospital to Rose to take reasonable care to 
prevent P causing physical harm to Rose.14  He referred to indicia of a duty of 
care obligation being owed by one to another, including the nature of control 
exercised by the defendant over the risk of harm, degree of vulnerability of 
those to whom the duty is said to be owed, and whether the existence of such a 
duty was consistent with the asserted duty of care.   
In finding that a duty of care existed, Macfarlan referred to the decision of 
the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Hunter Area Health Service v 
Presland.15  Briefly, the case there against Hunter involved a psychiatric patient 
released from their care who killed his brother’s fiancé within six hours of 
release.  He was acquitted on the basis of mental illness, but confined under 
mental health legislation.  He sued the medical authority for releasing them 
when he did for the mental anguish he suffered from the killing and 
consequences from it.  By majority there, the court found the defendant did not 
owe the plaintiff a duty of care.  Macfarlan JA here relied on the dissenting 
judgment in Presland of Spigelman CJ, who found that a duty of care existed in 
that case, based on control and vulnerability.  Spigelman CJ there found no 
conflict between the asserted common law duty and relevant obligations of 
authorities under the state’s mental health legislation.  And the judges in the 
majority in Presland made it clear that their decision in that case did not 
preclude an action different in kind from the one at issue there.  Santow JA 
specifically found that an action might be brought by a third party who had 
suffered serious physical harm due to actions of the person released.16 
Macfarlan J decided that the medical authority had breached its duty of 
care.  He was not satisfied that representatives of the authority could, on one 
day, be convinced that P warranted being involuntarily detained under the 
mental health legislation, and then apparently be satisfied on the very next day 
that the patient could be released without significant risk.  It was noteworthy 
Dr Coombes had not scheduled another appointment prior to release.  The 
patient’s symptoms were likely to fluctuate, and observations over just a few 
hours were not satisfactory in the context of a psychotic patient.  Admitting 
authorities had noted patient was at risk of harm to himself or others.  The 
overnight nurses had observed the patient to be in an agitated state.  Dr 
Coombes obviously had some concerns about the journey, but was apparently 
 
 
correctness of this approach: Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna; Hunter 
and New England Local Health District v Simon [2014] HCA 44, [14](French CJ Hayne Bell 
Gageler and Keane JJ), in terms with which I agree. 
14 [108]. 
15 [2005] NSWCA 33. 
16 [367]. 
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satisfied with the existence of mental health facilities along the intended path.  
It was common knowledge that the danger of a psychotic episode increased at 
night.  Dr Coombes knew it was likely the two would be in the car together at 
night, given the length of journey involved.  Dr Coombes declined to give P a 
depo injection which would have reduced the risk of an incident.  He knew P 
had a history of not taking medication, and had not had depo for seven months 
prior to admission.  Medication given to the plaintiff on the day of admission 
would likely have worn off by the time of the journey.  Macfarlan JA concluded 
that at the time of discharge, there was a foreseeable and not insignificant risk 
of P causing harm to R.  In terms of determining whether a reasonable person 
would have taken precautions, factors like the probability of harm occurring, 
likely seriousness of harm, burden of taking precautions and social utility of the 
activity that caused the harm were relevant.17  Here the risk of some harm to 
Rose was high; the risk of serious harm lower but still significant.  Very serious 
harm could occur.  The hospital had the capacity to detain P for longer and it 
would not have imposed an unreasonable burden upon them to do so.  In terms 
of the social utility of the action (releasing P), whilst the legislation did require 
P to be treated with the measures least invasive of his human rights, including 
the right to movement, the Act was also clearly concerned with ‘control’ of 
mental health patients for the purposes of treatment, but also protection of the 
patient and others. 
Macfarlan JA decided that the medical authority had caused the death of 
Rose.  In terms of s5D of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), their actions in 
releasing P were a ‘necessary condition’ of the occurrence of the harm in the 
sense that the opportunity for P to harm Rose only arose because of the 
hospital’s decision to release P.18 
In dissent, Garling J denied that a duty of care was owed.  Although the 
parties apparently conceded that if the hospital owed a duty of care to Rose, it 
also owed one to his family, Garling J suggested this concession was not 
appropriate.  He pointed out the law had always taken a narrower approach to 
claims for psychiatric injury, a position maintained by s30 of the Civil Liability 
Act 2002 (NSW).  However, his main ground of decision was that the hospital 
did not owe a duty of care to Rose.  He reached this conclusion after reading the 
relevant provisions of the mental health legislation.  Garling J stated that the 
Act was expressly focused on care, treatment and control of the mentally ill.  It 
did not expressly refer to protection of the public, or include it as an objective 
to be pursued under the Act.  It consistently reflected a sentiment that those 
suffering from mental health issues should be treated wherever possible in 
community-based settings in an informal and voluntary basis; involuntary 
detention and treatment was very much a last resort.  Patients were to be 
 
17 S5B Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 
18 [184]-[187]. 
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subject to the least restrictive environment allowing them to obtain appropriate 
care and treatment. 
Garling J observed the common law’s general antipathy towards 
suggestions that one person is legally required to prevent another person from 
causing injury, and the important distinction between not causing harm, and 
not preventing harm.  He reflected on comments by Brennan J in Sutherland 
Shire Council v Heyman19 to the effect that ‘if people were under a legal duty to 
prevent foreseeable harm to others, the burden imposed would be intolerable’.  
He found that recognition of an obligation to someone such as Rose would be 
in conflict with the obligations the hospital had to patients such as P; as such no 
duty of care was owed.20  Garling JA also concluded that even if a duty of care 
was owed, it had not been breached, since the risk of what actually transpired 
was not something that was reasonably foreseeable.  He further found 
applicable a provision of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) which confined 
liability for the exercise of special statutory powers to irrationality, and the 
parties had agreed that the decision here did not meet that standard.21  He 
commented on the failure of the plaintiffs to carefully articulate the parameters 
of the duty of care said to be owed. 
B High Court 
In November 2014, all five members of the High Court hearing the case allowed 
an appeal against the decision of the New South Wales Court of Appeal.22   
The primary reason for this decision was the Court’s finding that the 
hospital did not owe the plaintiffs a duty of care.23  It noted the significant 
emphasis that the relevant mental health legislation placed on measures that 
were minimally invasive to a patient’s rights, dignity and self-respect.  
Specifically, the power to involuntarily detain a mentally ill individual under 
the mental health legislation could only be exercised where the medical 
superintendent believed that no other care of a less restrictive kind was 
appropriate and reasonably available.24   
The High Court found that to impose a duty of care to persons such as the 
 
19  
20 [257]. 
21 [295]. 
22 Hunter and New England Local Health District v McKenna; Hunter and New England Local 
Health District v Simon [2014] HCA 44. 
23 This decision was in line with trends observed by Stewart and Stuhmeke of the low success rate 
of plaintiffs in negligence actions in the High Court in recent times, and the even lower success 
rate of plaintiffs seeking compensation against public authorities: Pam Stewart and Anita 
Stuhmeke ‘High Court Negligence Cases 2000-2010’ (2014) 36 Sydney Law Review 585. 
24 On recent trends in favour of deinstitutionalization in the mental health context, see Jonathan 
Bach ‘Requiring Due Care in the Process of Patient Deinstitutionalisation: Toward a Common 
Law Approach to Mental Health Care Reform’ (1989) 98 Yale Law Journal 1152. 
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plaintiffs here on the hospital in such cases would be in conflict with these 
provisions of the mental health legislation.  The mental health legislation 
required focus to be on the patient; the common law duty would require the 
hospital to have regard to others with whom the patient may come into contact 
later.  The Court noted that often, the risk of a mentally ill person acting 
irrationally would not be insignificant, and the consequences of these actions 
could be serious.  In many such cases, as a result of consideration of these risks, 
a decision maker would be minded to involuntarily detain, or continue to 
detain, a person suffering from mental illness.  This conflicted with the clear 
indications in the legislation that involuntarily detention was to be exercised as 
a last resort.  This conflict was fatal to the existence of the posited common law 
duty of care.25 Elsewhere, the High Court cast doubt on the correctness of the 
approach in lower courts which had treated as equivalent a putative claim by 
Rose himself, as opposed to a claim by his family. 26   It also hinted at 
indeterminacy issues, briefly raising concerns that if a duty of care was held to 
be owed to Rose and his relatives, it would be difficult to rule out claims by 
anyone with whom someone such as P might come into contact post-release.27 
II  PRECEDENT ON THE QUESTION OF WHETHER A BODY WITH 
STATUTORY RESPONSIBILITIES OWES A DUTY OF CARE 
As indicated earlier, in the past the Crown, and bodies entitled to the shield of 
the Crown, were considered to be immune from liability in tort.  This, together 
with an immunity from statute, was of ancient vintage, with the classic 
reference being to a quote in 1615 that ‘the King cannot do a wrong’.28  This 
 
25 [29]-[31]; the finding that no duty of care was owed meant the High Court did not consider 
the question whether the duty of care had been breached, what its precise scope might be, or 
whether the duty of care might be indeterminate.  Nor was the Court required to consider the 
application of other sections of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) in relation to claims for 
psychiatric injury and claims against public authorities.   
26 [15].  The High Court might have drawn support for this approach from the earlier decision of 
Chester v Waverley (1939) 62 CLR 1, a tragic case involving the drowning of a child in a trench 
dug by a Council.  His mother claimed damages for a psychiatric illness she claimed she suffered 
after observing her child being found in and recovered from the trench.  The Court denied the 
woman’s claim, but opined that if the son had lived but merely suffered injuries, he would have 
had a claim, as would any dependants of his, had he been older: 7 (Latham CJ), 11 (Rich J).  It is 
submitted that the High Court was correct, with respect, on both occasions, to treat as separate 
and independent claims the claim (if any) of the immediate victim, and the claim of those who 
suffered psychiatric illness as a result of the injury to the immediate victim.  (This is not 
intended to indicate that the author agrees with the outcome in Chester, which denied to the 
boy’s mother a claim in nervous shock on the basis that a person of normal constitution would 
not suffer such a psychiatric injury in such circumstances). 
27 [16]. 
28 Magdalen College Case (1615) 11 Co Rep 66, 72a; 77 ER 1235, 1243 (Lord Coke); adopted by 
Griffith CJ in Sydney Harbour Trust Commissioners v Ryan (1911) 13 CLR 338, 365 (Barton J 
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immunity from suit was limited then abolished in the United Kingdom in 1860 
and 1947 respectively.29  Its rejection is implicitly reflected in s64 of the 
Judiciary Act 1964 (Cth), and is expressed in various state legislation.30  Despite 
this abolition, judicial reluctance to find government bodies, particularly in this 
context government bodies with statutory responsibilities, liable in tort remains 
evident.31  Examples of special treatment in this context have included past 
immunity from liability for acts of non-feasance32 (abolished in Australia in 
2001),33 as well as recognition of a distinction between policy decisions (which 
enjoyed at common law34 and continue to enjoy in statute greater protection 
 
 
to like effect, 370).  If it were a word, rather than a phrase, what Coke said might be described as 
a contranym, because the phrase used can be interpreted in opposite directions.  Specifically, it 
might mean that no court could find that the monarch had done a wrong, because it was not 
possible; alternatively it might mean that monarchs, like the rest of the population, ought not 
(more accurate than ‘cannot’) do a wrong.  The suggestion of Crown immunity from liability 
and statute gained a footing (R v Cook (1790) 3 T.R 519, 521), and a strong presumption against 
the Crown being bound by statute accepted and applied for many years: Province of Bombay v 
Municipal Council for the City of Bombay and Another [1947] AC 58; there remains such a 
presumption in Australia, though it was weakened substantially in Bropho v Western Australia 
(1990) 171 CLR 1; Crown immunity from suit was abolished by legislation: see Petition of Rights 
Act 1860 (UK) and Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK); s64 Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth); William 
Holdsworth ‘The History of Remedies Against the Crown’ (1922) 38 Law Quarterly Review 141.  
29 The Petition of Rights Act 1860 (UK) and Crown Proceedings Act 1947 (UK); in 1866 the House 
of Lords conceded a public body could be liable in tort: Mersey Docks Trustees v Gibbs (1866) LR 
1 HL 93; Geddis v Proprietors of Bann Reservoir (1878) 3 App. Cas. 430, 455-456: ‘it is now 
thoroughly well established that no action will lie for doing that which the legislature has 
authorised, if it be done without negligence, although it does not occasion damage to anyone; 
but an action does lie for doing that which the legislature has authorised, if it be done negligently’ 
(Lord Blackburn). 
30 Claims Against the Government and Crown Suits Act 1912 (NSW) s4; Crown Proceedings Act 
1958 (Vic) s23; Crown Proceedings Act 1980 (Qld) s8; Crown Proceedings Act 1972 (SA) s10; 
Crown Suits Act 1947 (WA) s5; Supreme Court Civil Procedure Act 1932 (Tas) s64; Greg Taylor 
‘John Baker’s Act: The South Australian Origins of Claims-Against-the-Government Legislation’ 
(2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 736. 
31 ‘There may be special factors applicable to a statutory authority which negative a duty of care 
that a private individual would owe in apparently similar circumstances’: Crimmins v 
Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 34 (McHugh J).  Recently a majority 
of the United Kingdom Supreme Court denied that a body set up as a protective system with 
public resources should be held liable in negligence for the actions of a third party not under 
their control, although the body might contain defects, be at fault, or have failed to achieve its 
purpose/s: Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Another [2015] UKSC 2, [114-
115](Lord Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge 
agreed). 
32 Gorringe v Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council [2004] UKHL 15; Lord Hoffmann [38]; 
Lord Scott [65]; Lord Rodger [80] and Lord Brown [102]. 
33 Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
34 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157  CLR 424, 438 (Gibbs CJ), 469 (Mason J), 500 
(Deane J); Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1995) 192 CLR 330, 358 (Toohey J); cf 393 (Gummow 
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from civil action),35 and merely operational decisions, where the prospects of 
civil action are greater.  It has involved suggestions36 that the liability of a public 
authority in the field of tort law should be governed by public law principles 
often referred to in short-hand as ‘Wednesbury unreasonableness’, an approach 
which again, by design or otherwise, would tend to narrow the window of legal 
liability of public bodies, rather than the typical expression of legal 
responsibility in tort.  The usual fear in the law of tort of ‘floodgates litigation’ 
appears particularly pressing in this context.  The power that some public 
authorities is clearly very significant, creating the possibility of liability on a 
range of fronts; ‘fronts’ being interests that might clash.37  Local authorities 
sometimes need to make important policy decisions that a court might be ill-
equipped to second-guess, even if it were minded to do so and it was within 
judicial remit to do so.38  Defence of such actions might drain the resources of 
the organisation from more positive activities, in the context of limited public 
funding.39  
The question of the extent to which a body given statutory responsibilities 
owes a duty of care with respect to their exercise or non-exercise, and to whom, 
is one that had been considered by some previous cases.  It is instructive to note 
how that issue had been dealt with previously. 
An earlier case similar in some ways to the issues raised in Hunter is 
Sullivan v Moody.40  That case dealt with child welfare legislation which enabled 
 
 
J); the existence of a ‘policy’ exception was rejected by Gaudron McHugh and Gummow JJ in 
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 208 CLR 512, 560.  
35 See, for example, s42 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); s83 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); s35 Civil 
Liability Act 2003 (Qld); s5W Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); s38 Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); 
s110 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). 
36 Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923, 953: ‘the minimum preconditions for basing a duty of care upon 
the existence of a statutory power … are, first, that it would in the circumstances have been 
irrational not to have exercised the power, so that there was in effect a public law duty to act, and 
secondly, that there are exceptional grounds for holding that the policy of the statute requires 
compensation to be paid to persons who suffer loss because the power was not exercised’ (Lord 
Hoffmann, with whom Lords Goff and Jauncey agreed); this has not been accepted in Australia: 
Crimmins v Stevedore Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 35 (McHugh J), although 
an exception appears in Pyrenees Shire Council v Day (1995) 192 CLR 330, 347 (Brennan CJ), 
and was eventually rejected by the House of Lords: X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County Council 
[1995] 2 AC 633, 736 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, for the House).  Nonetheless, aspects of this 
approach have been subsequently adopted in civil liability legislation; see for example s43 and 
s43A Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). 
37 This has been recognised as being particularly acute in relation to police investigations: Tame 
v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317, 335 (Gleeson CJ), 396 (Gummow and Kirby JJ), 418 
(Hayne J); Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50. 
38 These factors are explored in the judgment of Lord Diplock in Dorset Yacht Co v Home Office 
[1970] AC 1033, 1067; see also . 
39 Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50, [89](Lord Phillips) and [133](Lord Brown). 
40 (2001) 207 CLR 562. 
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a government department to take certain actions in relation to child welfare.  
Their overriding concern in exercising their powers was said to be the interests 
of the child.  The legislation included a power to investigate claims of abuse of 
children.  The legislation stated that provided a child welfare worker acted in 
good faith and in accordance with the section, they should not bear any legal 
liability in respect of the investigation, and that any liability that would 
otherwise accrue, would lie against the Crown.  At issue were various reports 
which suggested that some fathers investigated had abused their children, 
conclusions later shown to be false.  Those falsely accused brought defamation 
action against the child welfare workers who compiled the reports, and the 
State.  The High Court dismissed the claim, on the basis that no duty of care 
was owed by the defendants to the plaintiffs; such a duty would be inconsistent 
with the responsibilities of the State under the Act with respect to child welfare. 
The Court noted that the fact a defendant owed a duty of care to a third 
party, or was subject to statutory obligations constraining the manner in which 
powers or discretions may be exercised, did not of itself rule out the possibility 
that it might owe a duty of care to a plaintiff.  Individuals could be subject to a 
number of duties, provided they were not irreconcilable.41  The Court noted, 
for example, that a medical practitioners reporting on the condition of an 
individual might owe duties to more than one person.  However, problems 
would arise when a suggested duty would give rise to inconsistent obligations; 
in that circumstance, the posited duty would be denied.  The Court also noted 
that where public authorities were charged with conducting investigations or 
exercising powers in the public interest or in the interests of a specified class of 
persons, the law would not ordinarily subject them to a duty to have regard to 
the interests of another class where it would impose upon them conflicting 
claims or obligations.42  Here there would be a conflict between the functions 
carried out by the child welfare authority, including investigating and reporting 
on possible child abuse, and a duty of care to those accused of that very thing.  
One would favour, in the event, of doubt that the claim be aired so it could be 
tested; the other would favour non-disclosure.43 
Several cases have involved claims against local authorities.  In Graham 
Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan,44 consumers who suffered ill-health after eating 
oysters contaminated by faecal matter alleged negligence against the local 
authority and state government with responsibilities over the waters from 
which the oysters were harvested.  The Court dismissed the claim.  In so doing, 
 
41 See also Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 77 (Kirby J), 
102-103 (Hayne J). 
42 582 (Gleeson CJ Gaudron McHugh Hayne and Callinan JJ); the Court also expressed concern 
with possible indeterminate liability (582) and noted that the plaintiffs might have remedies 
under the existing law of defamation (581). 
43 582. 
44 (2002) 211 CLR 540. 
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several observations were made with significance for the current context.  
McHugh J acknowledged that the mere fact a public authority was given powers 
exercise of which could prevent harm to others did not mean that the authority 
owed a duty of care.  However McHugh J then cited situations where such an 
authority would ordinarily owe a duty of care: (a) the authority has used its 
powers to intervene in a field of activity and increased the risk of harm to 
person; or (b) if it knows or ought to know that a member of the public relies 
on it to exercise a power to protect their interests.45  McHugh J identified 
several matters to be considered in relation to whether a statutory authority 
owes a duty of care: 
• would a reasonable public authority reasonably foresee that its act or 
omission, including a failure to exercise its statutory powers, might 
result in injury to the plaintiff or their interests? 
• was the authority in a position of control and did it have power to 
control the situation that brought about the harm to the injured 
person? 
• was the injured person or their interests vulnerable in the sense that 
the injured person could not reasonably be expected to adequately 
safeguard themselves from harm? 
• did the public authority know, or ought it to have known, of an 
existing risk of harm to the plaintiff or a specified class of persons 
including the plaintiff? 
• would imposition of the duty of care impose liability with respect to 
the defendant’s exercise of core policy-making or quasi-legislative 
functions?46 
In the same case, Gummow and Hayne JJ noted that the question of whether a 
statutory authority owed a duty of care to a class of persons involved 
consideration of factors such as the degree and nature of control exercised by 
the authority over the risk of harm that eventuated, the degree of vulnerability 
of those depending on the proper exercise by the authority of the powers, and 
whether the suggested duty is consistent with the terms, scope and purpose of 
the relevant statute.47  In denying that a duty existed here, Gummow and Hayne 
JJ took into account that the state was not aware of any particular 
contamination risk, and there had been no prior outbreaks.48 
The High Court also considered questions of liability of public authorities 
 
45 576. 
46 577. 
47 597-598; to like effect Kirby J (617); Callinan J spoke of ‘vulnerability, power, control, 
generality or particularity of the class, resources of and demands upon the authority’ (664); 
Gleeson CJ stated that a general legislative power to protect the public did not ordinarily give 
rise to a duty of care to a particular individual or members of a particular class (562). 
48 607. 
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in Brodie v Singleton Shire Council.49  There Gaudron McHugh and Gummow 
JJ noted that the statutory powers given to public authorities may give it such a 
significant and special measure of control over safety and property issues as to 
impose a duty of care.  The duty might entail seeking to minimise a danger to 
safety or warn of the danger, but control was a paramount issue.50  The duty of 
care was owed to a class of persons, identified as users of roads within the local 
authority’s control.51  The joint reasons noted that ‘the formulation of the duty 
of care includes consideration of competing or conflicting responsibilities of the 
authority’.52  Note that the position was not that the existence of competing or 
conflicting responsibilities negated a duty of care; it was that such facts would 
help shape, and confine, the posited duty of care. 
Earlier the liability of a local authority was considered in Pyrenees Shire 
Council v Day.53  There Council had statutory power to conduct works to 
prevent fires, as well as power to direct others to conduct works to prevent fires.  
A fire broke out at a particular premises which were part of the Pyrenees local 
government area.  A council building inspector discovered a defect in a 
fireplace at the premises, which remained unsafe.  The inspector told the tenant 
not to use the fireplace until it was fixed.  He wrote a letter to one of the owners 
stating the fireplace should not be used until it was replaced, repaired or 
removed.  The Council did not take any further steps.  Two years later, a tenant 
who was unaware of the previous problems lit the fireplace.  A fire ensured, 
destroying the premises and damaging an adjoining shop.  The shop owners 
successfully sued the Council in negligence. 
The Court found there was no conflict between the Council’s 
responsibilities under the Act, and a common law duty to those living in the 
immediate area of the relevant premises.  At least one of the reasons why 
Council was given power with respect to fireplaces was to reduce the risk of 
harm to nearby residents.54  The plaintiff was within a class of claimants within 
the contemplation of the legislation.55  The risk of not complying with the 
inspector’s directions was extreme.56  Neighbours were vulnerable and relied on 
the Council to exercise its powers appropriately and protect them from harm.57 
In the earlier case of Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman,58 members of the 
High Court again considered the extent to which a local government authority 
 
49 (2001) 206 CLR 512. 
50 559. 
51 577. 
52 580-581. 
53 (1995) 192 CLR 330. 
54 342 (Brennan CJ). 
55 347 (Brennan CJ). 
56 348 (Brennan CJ). 
57 359 (Toohey J); 370 (McHugh J). 
58 (1985) 157 CLR 424. 
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might owe a duty of care to those affected by its decisions, actions, or omissions.  
Gibbs CJ said that ordinary principles of the law of negligence should apply to 
public authorities, and that they could be liable if they exercised a power 
negligently, to someone who relied on what the public authority did, and could 
show they suffered injury as a result.59  Mason J agreed that a public authority 
could owe a duty of care to others, casting it in terms of that authority ‘creating 
a danger’;60 in that context the authority could owe a duty of care for the safety 
of others.  Alternatively it could be based on reliance.61 
A Non-High Court Decisions 
1 United Kingdom 
A case with somewhat analogous facts to the Hunter decision is Home Office v 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd.62  There young detainees in an institution for at-risk youth 
escaped from an island.  The detainees had criminal records, and had escaped 
from institutions in the past.  They were not properly restrained or supervised 
by relevant officers.  There was a deliberate policy with these institutions of 
giving those detained as much freedom and responsibility as possible, with a 
view to developing trust and responsible decision making.  In the course of 
their escape, they collided with a yacht owed by the plaintiff, and then boarded 
it, causing further damage to it.  The owner of the yacht sued the administrator 
of the institution in negligence.  Four of five members of the House of Lords 
dismissed an appeal against a finding that the Home Office owed a duty of care 
it had to the yacht owner. 
Lord Reid said there was good authority to support an action against a 
public authority that had exercised a statutory duty negligently.  He 
distinguished cases involving an exercise of discretion, but found that if the 
discretion was exercised carelessly or unreasonably, an action might still lie.  He 
acknowledged that the Home Office had conflicting considerations with which 
to contend – the public interest in protecting neighbours and their property 
from escapees, as opposed to the public interest in promoting rehabilitation.63  
The Home Office had pursued a policy of maximising detainees’ freedom with 
rehabilitation in mind.  This was reflected in statutory rules.64  Importantly, the 
 
59 445; to like effect Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 29 
(McHugh J regarded as a ‘settled category’ of liability involving the exercise of statutory powers 
where it was reasonably foreseeable that if not exercised with care, others could be injured. 
60 460. 
61 461, 464. 
62 [1970] AC 1004. 
63 1031. 
64 Borstal (No 2) Rules, 1949, r25 referred to detainees being able ‘to develop his individuality on 
right lines and with a proper sense of personal responsibility.  Officers shall therefore, while 
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fact that these conflicting considerations existed did not lead Lord Reid to a 
finding that to impose a duty of care on the Home Office with respect to an 
owner of a yacht nearby would be inconsistent with the Home Office’s duties to 
detainees.  Similarly Lord Morris acknowledged that officers had duties of care 
to their employers.  This did not obviate a duty of care to detainees; rather he 
held that the common law duty of care to detainees would be ‘conditioned by’ 
the other duties.65  Lord Morris emphasised the control that the officers had 
over those detained, in establishing that a duty of care existed.66  Lord Pearson 
took a similar view.  After acknowledging the Home Office’s deliberate policy 
of light supervision of and freedom for those detained in youth detention 
facilities, he continued: 
It would affect only the content of standard and not the existence of the 
duty of care.  It may be that when the method is being intensively employed 
there is not very much that the defendant’s officers can do for the protection of 
the neighbours and their property.  But it does not follow that the they have no 
duty to do anything at all for this purpose.  They should exercise such care for 
the protection of the neighbours and their property as is consistent with the due 
carrying out of the Borstal system of training.67 
Lord Diplock also referred to reconciliation of competing interests, in 
accepting the existence of a duty of care in the case.68  This balance of 
competing interests is also a theme in the Court of Appeal decision in W v 
Edgell, 69  there Bingham LJ discussed the balance between the patient’s 
legitimate desire to regain freedom, and the public’s legitimate desire to be 
protected from violence.  President Brown (as he then was) discussed 
exceptions to the general rule in favour of patient confidentiality, finding that 
 
 
firmly maintaining discipline and order, seek to do so by influencing the inmates by their own 
example and leadership and by enlisting their willing co-operation’. 
65 1036. 
66 1039. 
67 1056. 
68 1068-1069: ‘this … is the way in which the courts should set about the task of reconciling the 
public interest in maintaining the freedom of the Home Office to decide upon the system of 
custody and control of Borstal trainees which is most likely to conduct to their reformation and 
the prevention of crime, and the public interest that Borstal officers should not be allowed to be 
completely disregardful of the interests both of the trainees in their charge and of persons likely 
to be injured by their carelessness without the law providing redress to those who in fact sustain 
injury’; it should be acknowledged that Lord Diplock said in dicta that a decision to deliberately 
release a detainee which led to injury to a plaintiff would not lead to liability on the part of the 
Home Office, unless the decision was a wholly unreasonable one (1068).  I have elsewhere 
acknowledged that the House of Lords would later abandon the ‘wholly unreasonable’ test for 
establishing whether or not a public authority was liable in negligence: X (Minors) v Bedfordshire 
County Council [1995] 2 AC 633, 736 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, for the House). 
69 [1989] EWCA Civ 13. 
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in that case an exception was justified in the interests of public safety.70  A claim 
such as this is less likely to be successful when the victim is not identified of 
identifiable as a member of a specific class.71 
More common have been claims against police authorities in relation to 
their work.  These are somewhat analogous to the situation in Hunter since 
they involve questions about the exercise, or non-exercise, of statutory 
functions in the context of a victim complaining of injuries suffered as a result 
of how those functions were carried out.  There is evident reluctance to find 
police authorities liable in negligence for failing to prevent crime being 
committed, resulting in death or serious injury to victims and/or their families, 
even in circumstances where the victim had brought the specific danger to the 
attention of police.72  In these cases, the courts have established a general rule 
that police do not owe a duty of care to victims of crime to prevent crime from 
occurring.  This is subject to exceptions, including where there is control, or an 
assumption of responsibility.  These cases are of marginal relevance to the 
current situation, because in those decisions involving police, such as Hill v 
Chief Constable of West Yorkshire,73 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales 
Police and Anor,74 and Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle,75 there was an absence 
of control by the defendant of the actions of the wrongdoer.  The wrongdoers 
were not detained in custody, and then released, providing no direct parallels 
with Hunter, where the person committing the violence had been involuntarily 
detained, and then released.   
Despite this, the cases are of some use here.  Their reasoning is in some 
 
70 See also Jones v Smith [1999] 1 S.C.R 455 (solicitor-client privilege waived with respect to a 
psychiatric report which suggested that a particular person was likely to kidnap, rape and 
murder prostitutes in future due to overriding public safety interest in waiver). 
71 Palmer v Tees Health Authority [1999] EWCA 1533 (Stuart-Smith, Pill, Thorpe LJJ)(person 
had come to attention of authority as someone suffering from personality disorder and 
psychopathic personality, had been detained for a period in the hospital but had been released, 
had some history of violence and had suffered sexual abuse as a child, raped and murdered four 
year old girl; mother’s claim for psychiatric injury rejected as disclosing no cause of action, 
because the plaintiff was not a member of an identified or identifiable class). 
72 See for instance Michael and Ors v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Another [2015] 
UKSC 2, where a majority of the Supreme Court found police did not owe a duty of care to 
prevent violence against a woman who had called police to inform them her ex-boyfriend was 
returning to her house and had threatened to kill her.  The person taking the call assessed it as a 
‘G1’ call, requiring immediate police response.  They passed the message onto another police 
district, without reporting the threat to kill.  It was then assessed as a ‘G2’ call, requiring a 
response within 60 minutes.  About 15 minutes after the first call, the ex-boyfriend killed the 
victim.  A claim by the victim’s parents and children against the police was rejected on the basis 
no duty of care was owed.  The general rule that police did not owe a duty of care to prevent 
crime applied 
73 [1987] UKHL 12. 
74 [2015] UKHL 2. 
75 [2008] UKHL 50. 
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places similar to the reasoning the led the High Court to deny that a duty of 
care was owed in Hunter, in the focus on practical difficulties caused by 
imposition of a duty of care on the relevant decision maker (for instance, 
concern that it would encourage the decision maker to adopt a ‘detrimentally 
defensive frame of mind’), 76  would have financial implications for the 
government77 both in defending such actions and in taking pro-active measures 
to minimise risk of liability, and concern that the courts are not equipped to 
effectively second-guess police decisions regarding lines of enquiry.78  These 
arguments will be further considered below.  The other point is that in the most 
recent case of Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police,79 the two 
dissenting justices made statements supportive of the position I take here: 
The time has come to recognise the legal duty of the police force to take 
action to protect a particular individual whose life or safety is, to the knowledge 
of the police, threatened by someone whose actions the police are able to 
restrain.80 
2 United States 
The Supreme Court of California considered analogous questions in Tarasoff et 
al v University of California. 81   There P apparently told a University 
psychologist of his plans to kill a victim who had spurned his advances when 
she returned from holidays.  Police briefly detained P, but he was then released.  
No-one informed the victim, or their family, of the threat.  Two months later, P 
killed the victim.  Her family brought action in negligence against the employer 
of the psychologist and police for failure to protect and failure to warn.  In a 
landmark decision the Supreme Court found that a claim against the 
psychologist should proceed. 
The Court expressly found that the legal responsibilities of the psychologist 
were not confined to their immediate patient, and extended at least to those 
whom they knew were threatened by the patient.82  The Court considered and 
rejected claims that to impose a duty of care on the psychologist to others 
would be inconsistent with the duty of care, including a duty of confidentiality, 
that the psychologist owed to their patient, and that free and open 
communication was essential to the practice of psychology, something which 
recognition of a duty of care to third parties would inhibit.  The Court 
 
76 Hertfordshire Police v Van Colle [2008] UKHL 50, [89](Lord Phillips), [132](Lord Brown). 
77 Michael and Ors v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Anor [2015] UKSC 2, [122](Lord 
Toulson, with whom Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agreed). 
78 Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1987] UKHL 12. 
79 [2015] UKHL 2. 
80 [175](Lord Kerr), with whom Lady Hale expressed agreement: [197]. 
81 551 P. 2d 334 (1976). 
82 344. 
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responded that this interest had to be weighed against the public interest in 
safety from violence,83 concluding that ‘the protective privilege ends where the 
public peril begins’.84 
In Lipari v Sears, Roebuck and Co,85 the offender had been involuntarily 
detained in a mental hospital run by the Veterans Administration, a United 
States agency.  He was released and placed on a voluntary treatment program, 
which he subsequently discontinued.  A month later he shot and killed one 
person and seriously injured another.  The Court found that the United States 
agency owed a duty of care to third parties in relation to the offender.  The 
Nebraskan Court specifically rejected the argument apparently accepted by the 
High Court in Hunter: 
A second policy argument raised by the United States involves the goal of 
pacing mental patients in the least restrictive environment.  The United States 
contends that imposing liability on a psychotherapist would conflict with this 
goal because therapists would attempt to protect themselves from liability by 
placing their patients in a restrictive environment.  This arguments 
misinterprets the nature of the duty imposed upon the therapist.  The 
recognition of this duty does not make the psychotherapist liable for any harm 
caused by his patient, but rather makes him liable only when his negligent 
treatment of the patient caused the injury in question … despite the defendant’s 
protests to the contrary, a psychotherapist is not subject to liability for placing 
his patient in a less restrictive environment, so long as he uses due care in 
assessing the risks of such a placement.86 
Other American courts have noted the potential for conflict between goals 
of rehabilitation and treatment on the one hand, and public safety on the other.  
Notably, this has not led to a denial that those in charge of mental health 
facilities, prison etc owe or may owe a duty of care to members of the general 
public, but might mean that a duty of care (in the sense of a duty to warn, 
rather than a duty to protect) is more likely to be recognised where the person 
released sets themselves apart from the typical person detained in terms of 
specific dangerousness.87  Further, liability might be limited to members of an 
identifiable class, if such is possible, rather than to the general public.  A family 
 
83 346. 
84 347. 
85 497 F. Supp 185 (D. Nebraska, 1980). 
86 188-193; adopted and applied in Durflinger et al v Artiles et al 727 F. 2d 888, 901-906 (1984) 
(United States Court of Appeal, Tenth Circuit). 
87 Rollins v Peterson et al 813 P. 2d 1156, 1161 (1991): ‘the sensible approach is to recognise a 
duty on the part of the custodian that does not discourage the operation of transitional 
programs, but requires the custodian to use special care when the one in custody sets 
(themselves) apart .. in terms of dangerousness to an identifiable person or persons’ (Supreme 
Court of Utah). 
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member of the person attacked has been recognised as an identifiable class.88  
Some courts have permitted claims although no class is readily identifiable that 
is narrower than the general public.89 
The Supreme Court of Ohio decision of Estates of Morgan v Fairfield 
Family Counselling Center90 involved facts similar to that of Hunter.  Morgan 
had been diagnosed with schizophrenia and psychosis.  He was being treated 
with psychotherapy and counselling with the defendant over several months.  
He began not taking his medication, and his parents noticed his behaviour was 
deteriorating, including their son becoming increasingly verbally abusive, 
apparently talking to someone who was not there, and complaining of physical 
assaults and pain that were not real.  He was assessed twice in terms of 
involuntary detention, and on both occasions it was determined he did not fit 
the criteria.  About six weeks after the last assessment, he shot and killed both 
of his parents, and seriously injured his sister during a game of cards. 
The Supreme Court was comfortable with recognising that the defendant 
owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs in such a case.  The Court specifically noted 
that many cases had involved the striking of a balance between countervailing 
public interests, including that patients be placed in the least restrictive 
environment and that they not be involuntarily detained in an effort to avoid 
liability.91  The Court admitted to 
some trepidation concerning the imposition of a duty because of the fear 
that therapists will attempt to protect themselves from liability by involuntarily 
hospitalizing non-convict mental patients.  This fear, however, has no reliable 
statistical support.92  Instead the statistical evidence that is available indicates 
 
88 Hedlund v The Superior Court of Orange County 669 P. 2d 41 (1983)(son who suffered a 
psychiatric injury after patient being treated by psychologists shot his mother in presence of 
son). 
89 Estate of Johnson v Village of Libertyville 496 N.E. 2d 1219, 1223 (1986). 
90 673 N.E. 2d 1311 (1997) 
91 1321. 
92 The judges cited Daniel Givelbar, William Bowers and Carolyn Blitch ‘Tarasoff: Myth and 
Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action [1984] Wisconsin Law Review 443, 486; a 
similar result is found in Appelbaum, P ‘The New Preventive Detention: Psychiatry’s 
Problematic Responsibility for the Control of Violence’ (1988) 145 American Journal of 
Psychiatry 779; Patrick Fox MD concluded that the effects of a duty to warn on the 
psychotherapist-client relationship had been minimal: ‘Commentary: So the Pendulum Swings – 
Making Sense of the Duty to Protect’ (2010) 38(4) Journal of the American Academy of 
Psychiatry and the Law 474, 475; as did Douglas Mossman MD ‘Critique of Pure Risk 
Assessment Or, Kant Meets Tarasoff’ (2006) 75 University of Cincinnati Law Review 523, 526: 
‘psychotherapists accept the fact that, while they may regard themselves as the caregivers of 
individual patients, they sometimes must function as agents for social protection’; as did Renee 
Binder and Dale McNeil ‘Application of the Tarasoff Ruling and its Effect on the Victim and the 
Therapeutic Relationship’ (1996) 47 Psychiatric Services 1212.  Toni Wise commented on the 
positive social effects of the Tarasoff decision: ‘to the extent that Tarasoff has encouraged 
therapists to probe more fully into potential violence and to consult with colleagues when they 
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that Tarasoff has not discouraged therapists from treating dangerous patients, 
nor has it led to an increased use of involuntary commitment of patients 
perceived as dangerous.93 
This partly answers concerns raised in the police liability context in the 
United Kingdom regarding whether recognition of a duty of care would cause 
the decision maker to adopt a ‘detrimentally defensive’ frame of mind.  The 
research cited in the passage above casts doubt as to the extent to which 
recognition of a duty of care by the mental health professional in cases such as 
Hunter would lead to the kind of change in behaviour feared by some justices.94 
Fears that the Tarasoff decision would lead to an unsustainable increase in 
successful claims against mental health professionals for breaching the duty 
have similarly not been supported by empirical evidence.  A study of more than 
100 claims against mental health professionals for failure to protect or failure to 
warn at appellate level concluded that defendants are now rarely held to be 
negligent on grounds of failing to warn or protect.  In reviewing 21 years of 
legal history, we found just four cases in which psychotherapists were found 
liable for breach of a Tarasoff duty.95 
Fears that recognition of a duty of care to third parties was inconsistent 
with the mental health professional’s duty of care to the patient were also 
negated by comments such as the following from a practising psychiatrist and 
scholar that ‘I can scarcely conceive of a psychiatric interview in which the 
patient’s risk to self or others is not addressed’.96  An empirical study among 
mental health professionals found that ‘a duty to protect potential victims is not 
viewed as ethically repugnant’.97 
 
 
confront it, the decision may be a boon to the proper identification of the dangerous patient’: 
‘Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of 
Tarasoff’ (1978) 31 Stanford Law Review 165, 186. 
93 1325. 
94 Kathryn Peterson concluded that concerns about defensive decision making in the current 
context ‘show a concerning scepticism about the integrity of medical decision-making’: ‘Where 
is the Line to be Drawn? Medical Negligence and Insanity in Hunter Area Health Service v 
Presland’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law Review 181, 187. 
95 Matthew Soulier, Andrea Maislen and James Beck ‘Status of the Psychiatric Duty to Protect, 
Circa 2006’ (2010) 38(4) Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 457, 469. 
96 Patrick Fox ‘Commentary: So the Pendulum Swings – Making Sense of the Duty to Protect’ 
(2010) 38(4) Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law 474, 475. 
97  Daniel Givelbar, William Bowers and Carolyn Blitch ‘Tarasoff: Myth and Reality: An 
Empirical Study of Private Law in Action [1984] Wisconsin Law Review 443, 486, and ‘our 
respondents only endorsed the broader principle that a therapist has ethical responsibilities to 
protect potential victims … the data certainly contradict the assertion that therapists must only 
concern themselves with the welfare of their patients and not with that of society at large’ (476); 
recently Thomas Halfemeister, Leah McLaughlin and Jessica Smith stated it was now widely 
acknowledged that the effect of the Tarasoff ruling had not been ‘ruinous’ to clinical practice: 
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While the general words of the Restatement (Second) of Torts98 had been 
interpreted consistently with the Tarasoff decision to impose a duty on the 
mental health professional, the Restatement (3rd) of Torts is even more explicit; 
s41(b)(4) recognises specifically a duty of a mental health professional to third 
parties who might be harmed by the actions of their patient.99   
In summary, the American decisions demonstrate that it is not 
inconsistent with obligations owed by mental health professionals to recognise 
that they might owe a duty of care to those placed at risk by a decision to release 
a person from care.  It has not caused major disruption to how mental health 
professionals do their work.  It was not, and is not, inconsistent with their 
practice, and does not raise serious ethical issues.  And the ‘sky has not fallen in’, 
in terms of unmanageable numbers of claims, or successful claims, against 
mental health professionals in this context. 
III WHY THE HIGH COURT WAS WRONG TO DENY THAT A DUTY OF 
CARE EXISTED IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
In my respectful opinion, the High Court was wrong to deny that a mental 
health authority could, or did, owe a duty of care to family members of a person 
killed by someone whom the mental health authority had just released.  This 
denial was largely due to the Court’s finding of an inconsistency or 
incompatibility between the duty said to arise, and other provisions of the 
mental health legislation at the relevant time, most particularly the clear policy 
setting that involuntary detention was considered to be a last resort, and that 
treatment should be the least invasive of the patient’s dignity, human rights etc.  
I will now explain why I disagree with the High Court’s view.  For reasons of 
space, I will not consider in detail issues that are relevant to the resolution of 
the dispute between the parties, but which were not part of the High Court’s 
decision in the case.100  My focus is on the decision the High Court reached, and 
the reasons why in my respectful opinion it was incorrect. 
 
 
 
 
‘Parity at a Price: The Emerging Professional Liability of Mental Health Providers’ (2013) 50 San 
Diego Law Review 29, 79. 
98 American Law Institute Restatement (2nd) of Torts. 
99 American Law Institute Restatement (3rd) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm 
(2011). It should be acknowledged that some states have moved to regulate by statute the 
liability of mental health professionals; see for discussion Michael Geske ‘Statutes Limiting 
Mental Health Professionals’ Liability for the Violent Acts of Their Patients’ (1999) 64 Indiana 
Law Journal 391. 
100 These include, for example, the fact that it was a claim for psychiatric injury, the question 
whether any posited duty of care was breached, and the question of causation. 
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A The Act  
The authorities above clearly indicate that one important factor in deciding 
whether a statutory authority owes a common law duty of care to others with 
respect to the exercise of its powers is consideration of the object, scope and 
terms of the relevant statute.101 
It is true, as the High Court pointed out in Hunter, that sections of the 
Mental Health Act 1990 (now repealed) clearly indicate its focus on the 
treatment of individuals suffering from mental illness, and demonstrates 
appropriate sensitivity to the impact that involuntary detention and treatment 
may have on individuals by requiring least invasive means of treatment be used.  
For example, section 4 of the Act, setting out the objectives of the Act, and s20 
made clear the exceptional and last-resort nature of the power to detain 
involuntarily, as to ss28, 29 and 35.  All of these sections were appropriately 
discussed by the High Court in the course of making that point about the 
legislation. 
However, other sections of the Act were not discussed by the High Court.  
Section 21 allowed a medical practitioner or authorised person to detain a 
person on the basis of an opinion that they are suffering from mental illness or 
a mental disorder.  Chapter 3 of the legislation was entitled ‘Mentally Ill and 
Mentally Disordered Persons’.  Section 8, in that chapter, stated that for the 
purposes of assessing whether a person should be involuntarily detained under 
the Act, a person is mentally ill or mentally disordered only if they meet the 
criteria set out in that part of the Act.  That brings us to ss9 and 10.  Section 9 
stated that a person is a mentally ill person if they are suffering from a mental 
illness and, owing to that illness, there are reasonable grounds for believing that 
care, treatment and control of the person is necessary: 
(i) For the person’s own protection from serious harm; or 
(ii) For the protection of others from harm (emphasis added). 
Section 10 stated that a person is a mentally disordered person if the person’s 
behaviour at a given time is so irrational as to justify a conclusion on reasonable 
grounds that temporary care, treatment or control of the person is necessary: 
(i) For the person’s own protection from serious harm; or 
(ii) For the protection of others from harm (emphasis added).102  
 
101 For example, Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 563 (Gleeson CJ), 
574 (McHugh J), 597-598 (Gummow and Hayne JJ)(with whom Gaudron J agreed (570)), 617 
(Kirby J), 658-659 (Callinan J). 
102 Sections 14 and 15 of the (current) Mental Health Act 2007 (NSW) are in materially similar 
form, again including ‘protection of others from harm’ as one of the two criteria to be 
considered.  This mirrors mental health legislation elsewhere: see Mental Health Act 2014 (Vic) 
s29(b)(ii); Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld) s13(1)(d)(i); Mental Health Act 2009 (SA) s21(1)(b); 
2015     Liability of the Providers of Mental Health Services in Negligence  
 
187 
To emphasise, of the two criteria that a medical practitioner is to consider in 
assessing whether a person is suffering from a mental illness or mental disorder 
(concepts relevant to whether a person is to be involuntarily detained), one of 
them requires the decision maker to have regard to whether care, treatment and 
control of the person is necessary to protect others from harm. 
Given this fact, it is very difficult to fathom, or accept, a (terse103) finding of 
the High Court in Hunter that acceptance of a duty of care by the decision 
maker in such cases to possible victims of a person they might release would be 
inconsistent with the mental health legislation under which the decision to 
detain or release is made.104  How can it be inconsistent, with respect, when the 
very Act itself expressly contemplates that the decision maker will, indeed 
requires that they do, take into account the risk to others in assessing whether a 
person is mentally ill or mentally disordered, concepts directly linked to 
questions of involuntary detention?105 
It is also worth recalling Hunter Area Health Service v Presland, 106 
coincidentally a very similar case of negligence brought against a mental health 
service in that region.  There the plaintiff had been taken by police to a hospital 
following what was termed ‘bizarre and violent’ behaviour involving telling a 
person ‘he didn’t think he could kill him’, hitting a victim with a fence paling, 
grabbing others (including a three year old child) by the throat, jumping up 
into the air, and claiming that the ‘rats must die’.  He was then transferred to a 
public psychiatric hospital for assessment.  That hospital released him on the 
same day, in the company of his brother.  Six hours later the plaintiff killed his 
brother’s fiancé.  He was acquitted of a charge of murder on the basis of mental 
illness, and was then committed in a psychiatric institution.  When he was 
 
 
Mental Health Act 2006 (WA) s26(1)(b)(i); Mental Health Act 2013 (Tas) s17(1)(c); Mental 
Health (Treatment and Care) Act 1994 (ACT) s26(p)(ii); Mental Health and Related Services Act 
1998 (NT) s14(A). 
103 The Court explained its findings regarding inconsistent duties in five paragraphs: [29]-[33]. 
104 In this sense, the case is more akin to the finding in Pyrenees that although the Council owed 
obligations to a range of individuals, the obligation to a particular home owner complemented, 
and was not mutually exclusive of, obligations to owners of neighbouring properties, because the 
overriding obligation was public safety.  The same can be said in this case; in that way Sullivan v 
Moody can be distinguished because there really could be a conflict in that instance between a 
duty to thoroughly investigate claims of child abuse, guided by the best interests of the child, and 
the right of a person under investigation to their reputation. 
105 To reiterate, the purpose of determining whether a person is suffering from a mental illness 
or mental disorder is to consider their involuntary detention, continued involuntary detention 
or community treatment order: s8. 
106 [2005] NSWCA 33; see for discussion Ian Freckelton ‘Liability of Psychiatrists for Failure to 
Certify: Presland v Hunter Area Health Service and Dr Nazarian’ [2003] NSWSC 754’ (2003) 10 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 397; Kathryn Peterson ‘Where is the Line to be Drawn? Medical 
Negligence and Insanity in Hunter Area Health Service v Presland’ (2006) 28 Sydney Law 
Review 181.   
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released, he sued the mental health authority, arguing they were negligent in 
releasing him so soon on the first occasion, and if they had not done so, he 
would not have killed the victim and then been subsequently involuntarily 
detained, things which he claimed caused him emotional distress. 
It is conceded that a majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim in negligence.  Notwithstanding this, comments 
made by that court are considered highly relevant to the current issue. 
Spigelman CJ, who dissented in the result and would have allowed the 
claim, noted, as I have, the existence of ss9 and 10, including the reference to 
protection of others from harm as an important criterion to be considered in 
considering detention.  He then noted that 
If this were proceedings by a third party who had suffered harm at the 
hands of a mentally ill or disordered person, then it would fall within 
the intended sphere of protection to which the statutory provisions 
expressly relate.107 (emphasis added) 
Clearly these are dicta comments, but they fit precisely the situation at issue 
here.  If Spigelman CJ were considering Hunter, he surely would have found the 
existence of a duty of care owed to the plaintiffs, based on these comments.108  
His conclusion (on the same provisions as those considered in Hunter) is 
diametrically opposed to the interpretation rendered by the High Court in 
Hunter.  With respect, the view of Spigelman CJ is much preferred, based on 
the clear wording of ss9 and 10, sections to which the High Court did not refer 
in Hunter. 
And while Spigelman CJ was dissenting in that case, one of the members of 
the majority, Santow JA, made it clear that while the rejected the suggestion 
that this plaintiff had a claim, he may have reached a different conclusion had 
the plaintiff been someone who suffered at the hand of a person negligently 
released from the care of a mental health unit.109  This was in the context of his 
general statement that any person or organisation claiming an immunity from 
 
107 [29]; a leading scholar in the medico-legal field agrees: ‘properly construed … the criteria for 
involuntariness are not in conflict with the recognition of a duty  to treat provided the criteria 
are satisfied’: Ian Freckelton ‘Legal Liability for Psychiatrists’ Decisions About Involuntary 
Inpatient Status for Mental Health Patients’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 280, 288. 
108 Spigelman CJ dismissed an argument that a finding that a duty of care was owed to those 
other than the patient would lead to the practice of defensive medicine: ‘The Court ought to be 
slow to conclude that a medical practitioner acting true to his or her profession, would permit 
the process of formulating a professional opinion be distorted by the prospect of civil liability’: 
[37]; in contrast Sheller JA was concerned that this might occur: [297]. 
109 ‘This is not the case of an action brought by a third party against a careless hospital who was 
physically injured during a psychotic episode at the hands of someone whose compulsory 
detention for treatment would have averted the injury to that person’: [345].  Certainly, the fact 
that in Presland it was the wrongdoer who was the one claiming compensation was relevant to 
the court’s decision to reject the claim. 
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general principles of negligence liability, including statutory authorities, had to 
satisfy a ‘heavy burden of justification’,110 and his general agreement with 
Spigelman CJ’s espousal of relevant principles in terms of liability in negligence 
of statutory authorities.111   
Another state case found that a parole authority owed a duty of care to 
victims of someone they had released early upon conditions, based on specific 
suggestions that the person released was in breach of his parole conditions, 
placing children at risk.  The court did not conclude there that a duty of care to 
these victims was inconsistent with the parole board’s duties with respect to 
rehabilitation of offenders etc through the prudent use of early parole.112 
Similarly, the United Kingdom decision of Home Office v Dorset Yacht, and 
American decisions such as Tarasoff, cause us to question the extent to which 
duties of care to those detained involuntarily do irreconcilably conflict with 
duties to those who might be injured by someone being released from care.  In 
Home Office, the Court clearly concluded that recognition that authorities 
owed a duty of care to those who might be affected by escaped residents did not 
conflict with the policy behind the facility, which was to provide maximum 
freedom to residents and allow them to make decisions as much as possible.  
And the American decisions, led by Tarasoff, tend to negate the suggestion of 
an impossible conflict between the duty owed by mental health professionals to 
their patients, including minimally invasive treatment, and duties of care owed 
to those who might be injured by the person released from involuntary 
detention.  In fact, such duties have happily co-existed in the United States for 
some years.  The evidence is that it has not proven to be impossible, has not 
really changed the way in which mental health practice worked anyway, and 
was not inconsistent with ethical obligations owed by such professionals.  Rates 
of litigation or liability against mental health professionals have not proven 
manageable.  As always, there is no substitute for evidence-based decision 
making in preference to generalisations or assumptions. 
B Criteria for Recognition of  a Duty of Care Owed by Public Authorities 
McHugh J (other justices are also cited below) cited113 five factors to be 
considered in deciding whether a public authority owed a duty of care: 
• whether a reasonable public authority would reasonably foresee that 
its act or omission, including failure to exercise powers, might result 
in injury to the plaintiff 
 
110 [345]. 
111 [325]. 
112 Swan v State of South Australia [1994] SASC 5114 (Bollen J, with whom Mohr and Duggan JJ 
agreed).  
113 Crimmins v Stevedoring Industry Finance Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39; Graham Barclay 
Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 577. 
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• whether the public authority was in a position of control114 
• whether the plaintiff/s were vulnerable in that they could not 
reasonably be expected to adequately protect themselves from harm115 
• did the public authority know, or ought to have known, of an existing 
risk of harm to the plaintiff or of a class of persons of whom the 
plaintiff was one116 
• whether the imposition of the duty would impose liability with respect 
to the defendant’s core policy making or quasi-legislative functions. 
I will apply each of these factors to the facts in Hunter.117 
Regarding the first factor, it is clearly foreseeable that a person with a 20 
year history of mental illness, psychosis, suffering from hallucinations, and on 
little medication might pose a danger to those around him.  The hospital 
authorities were aware that P was to be released into the care of his friend Rose, 
and were aware that the two would be sharing a vehicle during a journey of 
1200 kilometres.  The fact that doctors were conscious that this was risky is 
 
114 Control was also cited as a critical consideration in the context of whether a statutory 
authority owed a duty of care by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 597 (with whom Gaudron J agreed (570)); Kirby J (630), Callinan J 
(664); and in Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 (Gummow Hayne and 
Heydon JJ), 261 (Crennan and Kiefel JJ)(in the context of police officers with statutory powers); 
control is important to duty of care issues more generally: Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, 
198 (Gaudron J), 212 (McHugh J), 234 (Gummow J); Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 
195 (Gleeson CJ), 201 (Gaudron J), 326 (Callinan J); Adeel’s Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak (2009) 
239 CLR 420, 436-437 (French CJ Gummow Hayne Heydon and Crennan JJ).  As indicated 
above, the question of control or lack of it is also critical in decisions of the United Kingdom 
Supreme Court regarding whether a public authority owes a duty of care: Michael and Others v 
Chief Constable of South Wales Police and Anor [2015] UKHL 2, [99](Lord Toulson, with whom 
Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Reed and Lord Hodge agreed). 
115 Vulnerability was also cited as a critical consideration in the context of whether a statutory 
authority owed a duty of care by Gummow and Hayne JJ in Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v 
Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 597 (with whom Gaudron J agreed (570)); Callinan J (664); Stuart v 
Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, 254 (Gummow Hayne and Heydon JJ) and 260 
Crennan and Kiefel JJ in the context of police officers with statutory powers; vulnerability is 
important to duty of care issues more generally: Hill v Van Erp (1997) 188 CLR 159, 186 
(Dawson J)(with whom Toohey J agreed (188)); Perre v Apand Pty Ltd (1999) 198 CLR 180, 195 
(Gleeson CJ), 201 (Gaudron J), 220, 225 (McHugh J), 259 (Gummow J); Jane Stapleton ‘The 
Golden Rule at the Heart of Tort Law: Protection of the Vulnerable’ (2003) 24 Australian Bar 
Review 135. 
116 This is relevant in terms of floodgates arguments.  For example, the United States courts have 
been more likely to recognise a claim where the plaintiffs were specifically known to the 
defendants as being individuals likely to be affected by the actions of the person released (for 
example, family members and loved ones), rather than strangers (see discussion at footnotes 88 
and 89). 
117 The High Court did not consider these five issues in Hunter in determining whether a duty of 
care was owed; Macfarlan JA (with whom Beazley P agreed) considered and applied these factors 
in the New South Wales Court of Appeal: McKenna v Hunter and New England Local Health 
District [2014] NSWCA 476, [93]-[95].   
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borne out by the fact that they made enquiries about the route that would be 
taken, and were satisfied that there were numerous mental health facilities 
along the way.  (It remains unclear how this would be of assistance if the patient 
suffered an episode in a place and at a time where it was not possible to obtain 
the required assistance, something which would tragically come to pass).  And 
surely, it was foreseeable that if the patient did commit violence towards Rose, 
members of Rose’s family would or might suffer psychiatric injury as a result. 
Secondly, the public authority had very significant control over P.118  It had 
involuntarily detained him as the legislation empowered it to do, and had the 
power to continue to do so.  The power to detain someone against their will is 
one of the most significant powers that a person or organisation can possess in 
relation to another. 
Thirdly, the plaintiffs were vulnerable.  They had no control over the 
release of P.  They had no means of knowing what condition P was suffering 
from, and what it might lead him to do.  They did not know what medication 
he was on.  There is no evidence they were aware of his long-term mental 
health history, or his previous suicide attempts.  They had no say in whether P 
was released or not, nor whether he should be released into the care of a friend 
to share a long journey.  There was no way they could protect themselves from 
the injuries they suffered.  To the extent that they might have implored Rose 
not to take the journey, they were not in a position to determine the danger that 
their son/brother was in by volunteering to share this journey as a friendly 
gesture.  They did not have the professional expertise to make this 
assessment.119 
 
118 This helps to distinguish the case of Stuart v Kirkland-Veenstra (2009) 237 CLR 215, where 
the High Court dismissed a claim that police had breached a duty of care they owed to herself 
and her husband.  Police had observed her husband in a stationary vehicle with a hose pipe 
running from the exhaust to the interior of the vehicle, but had declined to exercise their power 
to detain persons who they believed were suffering from mental illness.  One of the reasons the 
Court gave in denying a duty of care existed was the lack of control - that police did not control 
the source of the risk to the man, and they did not put the man in harm’s way (255)(Gummow 
Hayne and Heydon JJ)(see also Crennan and Kiefel JJ, 261-263).  The former joint reasons 
contrasted this with the position if the man were in police custody where control would be 
established (255).  In contrast here, the defendant did control the source of the risk – they had 
involuntarily detained P and decided to release him.  By so doing, they put those who might 
come into contact with P in harm’s way. 
119  Nor, indeed, did Rose, although the claim of Rose’s family members is considered 
independent of any claim that Rose might have had.  Some argue that had Rose survived, the 
defendant might have been able to successfully use the defence of volenti non fit injuria.  
However, as this requires a full appreciation of the risks taken on, it is unlikely that Rose did 
fully appreciate the risk, given that he was not an expert in mental health, was not aware of what 
medication P was or was not on, etc.  It is likely he simply relied on the expertise of the 
defendant in determining, having regard to the risk that the person posed to themselves and to 
others, that the patient was not suffering a mental illness or mental disorder such as would or 
might lead to involuntary detention. 
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Fourthly, the defendant ought to have appreciated that to release P when 
they did posed risks to people like the plaintiffs.  They knew he had a 20 year 
mental illness.  They knew he was suffering from psychosis and auditory 
hallucinations.  They knew he often did not take his medication, and was very 
lightly medicated at the time he was released.  They knew he was to embark on 
a journey of 1200 kilometres in a car, and they knew that being out at night, 
and being in a confined space, both of which would occur during the journey, 
would increase the risk of a relapse.  If they knew this presented real risks to the 
person P would share the car with, Rose, they must have known that if Rose 
suffered serious injury or death, that could well cause psychiatric injury to 
members of Rose’s family.  Case law has, eventually,120 recognised that death or 
injury to a person may well lead to psychiatric injury to others who were close 
to the person, including family members.121 
The High Court has repeatedly shown concern with the spectre of 
indeterminate liability.  Would recognition of a duty of care in this situation 
create indeterminate liability?  The answer is suggested to be ‘no’.122  The 
plaintiffs are family members of a victim with whom P was placed, with the 
knowledge of the public authority.  The victim collected P from hospital.  One 
of the doctors had spoken with the victim directly about the travel 
arrangements.  The plaintiffs are family members of the victim.  In my view, 
recognition of a duty of care in those circumstances does not create the spectre 
of indeterminate liability to an unascertainable class.  The class includes the 
person to whom the mental patient was released, and the family members of 
that person.  It is not necessary, or necessarily helpful, for me to speculate 
further as to whether others are within the class of those who might be able to 
sue in such a situation.123  For instance, what if the victims were strangers, who 
happened to be in the vicinity where P killed Rose?  What if the victim was not 
Rose, but a service station attendant on the way etc.  We could endlessly play 
the ‘what if’ game.   
However, if recent experience with the law of tort has taught us anything, it 
 
120 The days of Chester v Waverley Corp (1939) 62 CLR 1, where three of the four High Court 
judges presiding could say it was not a ‘normal’ or expected (foreseeable) reaction that a mother 
would suffer psychiatric injury after seeing her drowned son retrieved from a trench (Latham CJ 
(10), Rich J (11), Starke J (13), are thankfully long gone. 
121 Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
122 This was the same answer given by Macfarlan JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
(with whom Beazley P agreed): ‘this concern (of indeterminate liability) is not in my view 
applicable to the present case as the plaintiffs’ claim arises out of harm being suffered by a 
specific individual, Mr Rose, with whom the hospital had direct dealings and into whose custody 
the hospital released (P)’: [97]. 
123 It should be recalled, however, that the High Court has been prepared to frame the ‘class’ to 
whom the duty of care is owed very broadly.  An instance was Brodie v Singleton Shire Council 
(2001) 206 CLR 512, where the duty was framed as being owed by the public authority to users 
of their roads. 
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is that it can be dangerous to try to answer every question in one case, with a 
comprehensive statement of all the occasions in which liability will be owed for 
this or that wrong, or definitive expositions of which principles cover all cases.  
We have realised that this is too ambitious a task, at least in this area, favouring 
now an incremental, case by case approach more familiar with general common 
law development.124  So to say that members of Rose’s family are owed a duty of 
care by the mental health authority in this case is not to comprehensively 
identify all possible members of the class that might be entitled to sue for a 
negligent release from mental health care.  But it is not considered to raise the 
spectre of unmanageable, indeterminate liability.  The United States evidence is 
instructive here, with empirical evidence that the prospects of successfully suing 
for negligent failure to protect, or failure to warn, remain low, even in a country 
often caricatured as being excessively litigious and the home of law suits that 
defy common sense, yet succeed.  
And fifthly, to find a duty of care here would not intrude on the authority’s 
core policy making or quasi-legislative functions.  This duty of care relates to an 
operational decision about a particular patient.  In terms of the past distinction 
between policy and operational decisions, it is clearly at the operational end, 
dealing as it does with the treatment of a particular patient.  I have explained 
how recognition of a duty of care works with, and is not at cross-purposes with, 
policy in this area identified in the relevant legislation, including that in 
considering whether to involuntarily detain a person, the risk they pose to 
others is an important factor.  Recognition of such a duty in the United States 
has proven to be workable. 
C Other Legislation 
Legislation in the slightly different context of preventive detention of past sex 
offenders also gives us some cause for reflection here.  (This comparison is not 
intended to equate those prisoners who have been convicted of a crime, and 
those who are suffering from mental illness; however some features of 
legislation in the context of convicted sex offenders are considered relevant).  
Several states have legislation permitting the court to make an order continuing 
the incarceration of a past sex offender, based on a psychiatric assessment of the 
likelihood that the offender will re-offend.  For instance, s11 of the Dangerous 
Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld) provides for a psychiatrist’s report 
in relation to an application for continued detention of a convicted sex offender 
past the date upon which they would otherwise be eligible for release.  Section 
11(2) indicates the psychiatrist’s report must indicate the level of risk that the 
 
124 Lord Wright declared the common law way was to go ‘from case to case, like the ancient 
Mediterranean mariners, hugging the coast from point to point, and avoiding the dangers of the 
open sea of system or science’: (1938) 54 Law Quarterly Review 185, 186; Perre v Apand Pty Ltd 
(1999) 198 CLR 180, 216-217 (McHugh J). 
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offender will commit another serious sexual offence if released.  Similarly, 
s6(3)(b) of the Crimes (High Risk Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW) requires a report 
of a qualified psychiatrist report, registered psychologist or registered medical 
practitioner which includes the likelihood of the offender committing further 
sex offences.   
Two observations can be made regarding these provisions.  Here I put 
aside important arguments regarding the accuracy with which psychiatrists can 
in fact predict future behaviour, a hotly contested debate upon which it is not 
necessary to dwell for current purposes.125  Firstly, they reflect that psychiatrists 
are routinely called upon to make an assessment regarding a person’s likely 
future conduct, including likely wrongdoing that will harm others.  As a result, 
recognition of a duty of care in the circumstances in Hunter would not impose 
on relevant persons a responsibility for which their training makes them 
unprepared or unqualified.  The American research evidence referred to above 
supports this, where psychiatrists surveyed indicated the question of public 
safety was always paramount in the minds of decision makers considering 
involuntary detention. 
Secondly, this type of legislation requires courts to balance the report of the 
psychiatric experts with other factors, including (specifically) public safety.126  
The courts have not found it impossible to balance a range of factors, including 
the general expectation that a person who has served the full jail term to which 
they have been sentenced would be freed, public safety, possible re-offending, 
whether the person has been rehabilitated etc.  No-one says it is easy for a 
decision maker to balance this range of factors in particular cases, but the 
legislation clearly contemplates this kind of balancing exercise will occur in this 
space.  Given this, it does not seem unreasonable to expect a psychiatrist 
dealing with legislation permitting them to involuntarily detain a person 
(expressly as a last resort) to have regard to public safety and the risk that the 
person already detained or whom could possibly be detained under the 
legislation will offend unless detained, in making their deliberations.  In 
applying this duty of care, the court would of course take into account that the 
legislation specifically states that involuntary detention of someone suffering a 
mental illness is to be used as a last resort.  This feature of the legislation should 
shape the scope and context of the duty of care owed; it should not preclude 
it.127 
 
125 Bernadette McSherry ‘Sex, Drugs and ‘Evil’ Souls: The Growing Reliance on Preventive 
Detention Regimes’ (2006) 32(2) Monash University Law Review 237, 268-269. 
126 S13(4)(i) Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 (Qld); s9(3)(a) Crimes (High Risk 
Offenders) Act 2006 (NSW). 
127 ‘Proper application of the least restrictive principle should be incorporated in, but not 
dominate, the evaluation of whether a proper basis for involuntariness was present and therefore 
whether a reasonable psychiatrist in the psychiatrist’s position would have taken the precaution 
of imposition or maintenance of the person’s involuntary inpatient status’: Ian Freckelton ‘Legal 
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D Other Matters in Brief 
1 Claim for Psychiatric Illness 
The case could have called for further consideration of the circumstances in 
which a claim for psychiatric illness could succeed, given that was the nature of 
the claim of the plaintiffs.  Obviously that has been an area of difficulty for the 
common law in the past.128  However, the defendants in the case did not dispute 
that the plaintiffs had suffered a recognised psychiatric illness of the required 
kind.129  Nor did they argue that the injury suffered was outside what could 
have been foreseen would be suffered by a person of ‘normal fortitude’.130  As a 
result, these issues did not need to be, and were not, argued at any point, so 
further discussion of this issue is not considered necessary for current 
purposes.131   
2 Whether any Duty of Care was Breached 
The High Court did not consider this issue, because in its view there was no 
duty of care owed.  Macfarlan JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
outlined the reasons for his conclusion that the defendant had breached its duty 
of care to the plaintiffs, primarily based on the medical evidence discussed 
earlier.  As I agree with Macfarlan JA on this point for the reasons he provides, 
 
 
Liability for Psychiatrists’ Decisions About Involuntary Inpatient Status for Mental Health 
Patients’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 280, 289.  This reflects the position of Gaudron 
McHugh and Gummow JJ in Brodie (see discussion around footnote 52). 
128 Chester v Waverley Corp (1939) 62 CLR 1; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549; Alcock v 
Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police [1992] 1 AC 310; Tame v New South Wales (2002) 211 
CLR 317; all of these cases must now be read in light of applicable civil liability legislation, for 
example ss27-33 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW).  
129 S31 and s33 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Simon and Another v Hunter and New England 
Local Health District; McKenna v Hunter and New England Local Health District [2012] 
NSWDC 19, [6](Elkheim SC DCJ)(‘Simon’).  Obviously a mother and sisters are close family 
members for the purposes of s30 of the New South Wales Act.  Equivalent provisions exist in 
most other jurisdictions: s72(1) Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic); s33(1) Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA); 
s58(1) Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); s34(1) Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); s34(1) Civil Law 
(Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT). 
130 S32 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Simon [6]; as a result, it is not considered appropriate to 
discuss the factors in s32(2) in any depth here. 
131 For further consideration of this issue, see Peter Handford ‘When the Telephone Rings: 
Restating Negligence Liability for Psychiatric Illness’ (2001) 23 Sydney Law Review 597; Peter 
Handford ‘Psychiatric Injury: The New Era’ (2003) 11 Tort Law Review 13; Margaret Fordham 
‘Psychiatric Injury, Secondary Victims and the Sudden Shock Requirement (2014) Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 41; Danuta Mendelson ‘Psychiatric Injury Law in England and Australia 
– Drawing Closer Together?’ (2007) 15 Journal of Law and Medicine 176; Ian Freckelton 
‘Compensation for Pure Psychiatric Injury: Resolution from the Australian High Court?’ (2002) 
10 Journal of Law and Medicine 133. 
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it is not considered necessary to discuss the question of breach in any depth. 
3 Causation 
Another possibly contentious issue could be whether anything the defendant 
did caused the plaintiff’s recognised psychiatric illness.  However, while the trial 
judge did discuss causation, this was on the basis agreed to by both parties that 
the same principles were to apply to a claim by Rose, as to a claim by Rose’s 
family.  As indicated, it is not my belief that this approach was correct, and I 
respectfully agree with the High Court’s ambivalence on this.  It is considered 
to be more difficult for a person like the plaintiffs here, who have suffered 
psychiatric illness, to show their injuries were caused by the hospital’s 
negligence, than it would be if Rose, say, were merely injured and not killed on 
the journey, and wished to claim.  He would more readily have been able to 
show his injuries were caused by the hospital’s negligence.  I will not consider 
the causation issue further here, since the trial judge’s finding that causation did 
not exist was overturned by the Court of Appeal.  The High Court did not 
consider the issue, given its finding that a duty of care was not owed. 
4 Questions of Public Policy 
For a time, the test applied to determine cases of alleged negligence explicitly 
considered whether questions of public policy negated the existence of a duty of 
care.132  The High Court rejected that approach in Sutherland Shire Council v 
Heyman,133 but there is still sporadic express reference to policy in the case 
law,134 and it is possible that some justices are implicitly having regard to such 
matters in reaching their conclusions.  Some of the civil liability statutes make 
express reference to such matters, at least in the context of public authorities.135  
Clearly policy factors are still relevant in the United Kingdom in this area.136  
 
132 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. 
133 (1984) 157 CLR 424, 465 (Mason J), 481 (Brennan J), 508 (Deane J); Gibbs CJ and Wilson J 
dissenting.  In the case of Stuart and Another v Kirkland-Veenstra and Another (2008) 237 CLR 
215 (a High Court case involving an allegation against police for failing to exercise a power), 
there is no mention in any of the judgments about policy considerations that arise with respect 
to claims against police, in sharp contrast to the United Kingdom case law where consideration 
of policy has been significant in this context. 
134 Eg Crimmins v Stevedoring Committee (1999) 200 CLR 1, 39 (McHugh J); Graham Barclay 
Oysters v Ryan (2002) 211 CLR 540, 578 (McHugh J); policy concerns underlie the High Court’s 
maintenance of barrister immunity from suit: D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 
CLR 1. 
135 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW) Part 5; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) Part 12; Civil Liability Act 2003 
(Qld) Chapter 2 Part 3; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA) Part 1C; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) Part 
9; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT) Chapter 8. 
136 A recent example appears in Michael and Ors v Chief Constable of South Wales Police and 
Anor [2015] UKSC 2, [122], explicitly discussing the financial consequences if police were held 
to owe a duty of care to victims of crime. 
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To the extent public policy is and should be relevant here, it is worth recalling 
the sentiment of Sir Thomas Bingham MR in X (Minors) v Bedfordshire County 
Council137 to the effect that the rule of public policy which has first claim on the 
loyalty of the law is that stating that wrongs should be remedied.  Clearly, there 
is strong public interest in upholding high standards in medical endeavours, 
and legal principle should reflect community expectations. 138   Individuals 
expect governments to take reasonable steps to protect their safety.  When a 
duty of care is imposed on virtually all other professionals, it is hard to justify 
what effectively seems like a new immunity139 in the area of mental health 
service providers.  Recognition that a duty of care exists can have positive 
benefits in terms of encouraging high standards and appropriate care within a 
particular field; the opposite also holds.140  This point has been the subject of a 
quantitative study.141 
 
 
137 [1995] 2 AC 633. 
138 Rogers v Whitaker (1992) 175 CLR 479. 
139 Indeed, the general trend has been towards abolishing immunities from suit rather than 
creating more (Brodie v Singleton Shire Council (2001) 206 CLR 512), though some traditional 
immunities remain, at least in Australia: D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 223 CLR 1. 
140 Ian Freckelton ‘Legal Liability for Psychiatrists’ Decisions About Involuntary Inpatient Status 
for Mental Health Patients’ (2014) 22 Journal of Law and Medicine 280, 289: ‘protection from 
liability in negligence extended to psychiatrists (and … hospitals) … in (Hunter) and Presland 
… has gone beyond what is defensible in terms of legal principle, creates a category of lack of 
accountability that is not conceptually or clinically justified, and may well have undesirably 
counter-therapeutic consequences’; Ian Freckelton ‘Liability of Psychiatrists for Failure to 
Certify: Presland v Hunter Area Health Service and Dr Nazarian [2003] NSWSC 754’ (2003) 
10(2) Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 397, 403. 
141 Lucinda Platt, Maurice Sunkin and Kerman Calvo ‘Judicial Review Litigation as an Incentive 
to Change in Local Authority Publice Services in England and Wales’ (2010) 20(2) Journal of 
Public Administration Research 243, who concluded that litigation could act as a ‘modest driver 
to improvements in local government services’; the Law Commission also reflected on the 
potential positive benefits to litigation, in the context of recommendations to streamline the law 
with respect to public authority liability in private law: Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and 
the Citizen [2010] EWLC 322, para 4.27. 
